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INTRODUCTION

When business is conducted through agents, commercial bribery
often occurs. 1 Its prevalence results from the economic incentives
facing both the agent and those seeking a contract with the principal.
As long as the agent has no direct interest in the contract, he might be
tempted to deal with individuals based on a side payment. At the
same time, such a payment can cost the party seeking the contract far
less than by competing through lowering prices or increasing the
quality of the product. Given that most large transactions involve
government or private organizations that can only operate through
agents, the loss of price and quality competition resulting from commercial bribery imposes a significant toll on consumer welfare.2
• Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific .
l. See, e.g., A . BEQUAI, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A 20TH CENTURY CRISIS 42 (1978)
("In large urban centers like New York, one out of every seven dollars exchanging hands may
be tainted with commercial bribery."); M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 15586 (1980) (arguing that commercial bribery is a widespread business practice); Gilman, Bribery
of Retail Buyers Is Called Perval·ive, Wall St. J ., Apr. I. 1985, at 6, col. I (bribery of buyers fo r
retail stores is pervasive); Burrough, Oil-Field Investigators Say Fraud Flourishes. From Wells
ro Offices, Wall. St. J., Jan. 15, 1985, a t I, col. 6 (giving bribes and kickbacks to oil company
employees is widespread).
2. See. e.g., Gilman, supra n ote I, at 6, col. I (bribery of buyers for retail stores res ults in
the stores paying more for thei r goods, which in turn cuts their profit and causes them to raise
prices to consumers); Burrough, supra note I , at I, col. 6 (bribes and kickbacks from vendors
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Many laws potentially address this practice. 3 This article examines one: The Sherman Act. 4 There are two reasons for focusing on
the Sherman Act. First, as this article argues, commercial bribery is
an agreement or combination that has the effect of increasing prices
and depriving consumers of the advantages of free competition.
Hence, it is precisely the sort of conduct that section 1 of the Sherman
Act is intended to prohibit. 5 Second, commercial bribery claims that
are predicated on the Act are coming before the courts with increasing frequency. 6 The decisions in these cases have yielded results and
to oil company employees lead to higher prices for oil field goods and results in thirty to forty
percent higher drilling costs in some cases and has increased energy costs for consumers).
3. The penal codes of a large number of states make commercial bribery a crime. See,
e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw§§ 180.00-1 80.08 (McKinney Supp. 1987). For a listing of state laws
that outlaw commercial bribery, see Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37. 44 nn.9 & 10 (1979).
Several federal statutes may also render commercial bribery criminal under certain conditions.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 215 (West Supp. 1987) (bribery of bank employees); 27 U .S.C. § 205(c)
(1982) (commercial bribery in the alcoholic beverage industry); 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982)
(payments to labor representatives); 49 U.S.C. § 11907 (1982) (bribery of railroad employees);
see also P errin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (crossing state lines to commit comme rcial
bribery may violate the Travel Act, 18 U .S.C. § 1952 (1982)); United States v. Beckley, 259 F.
Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (bribing employee of telephone company to allow uncharged use of
long distance service may violate the wire fraud statute, 18 l'.S.C. § 1343 (1982)); United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (1942) (using mail to commit commercial
bribery may violate the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)). In addition, principal• of
bribed agents have a common law cause of action against the briber. E.g.. Continental
Management, Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613, 616 (Ct. Cl. 1975). The dishonest agent may
also be subject to a common law action by a principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 403, 404, 404A, 407 ( 1958). Also, the Federal Trade Commission condemns commercial
bribery as an unfair trade practice. 16 C.F. R . § 13.315 ( 1986). Other sanctions are less direct.
The Internal Revenue Code denies a deduction for commercial bribes. I.R.C. § 16l(c)(2)
(1982). The securities laws may force public corporations to disclose such payments. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978). Following disdosure,
shareholders may bring an action alleging that corporate managers violated their fiduciary
duty hy engaging in bribery. See, e.g., Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d
Cir. 1974). For further discussion of the various laws employed to attack commercial bribery
in both domestic and foreign transactions, see Gevurtz, The United States Approach to
Combating Bribery in the International Sale of Goods, in SuRVEY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SALem Gooos 333 (1986).
4. 15 u.s.c. §§ l -7 (1982).
5. See. e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U .S. I (1979).
6. See. e.g., Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1985):
Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F. 2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983);
Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cere. denied,
450 U.S. 1030 ( 1981): Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961); NL Indus., Inc. v. Gulf & W. Indus., 650 F. Supp.
1115 (D. Kan. 1986); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 6.B (D .
Alaska 1982); City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc.. 1982-1 Tra,d e Cas. (CCH) 'l 64,527
(N.D . Ga. 1982); W.T. Grant Co. v. Christensen, 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 60,324 (S.D.N.Y.
1975): Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho 1964), a.IJ'd
on other grounds, 35 1 F .2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966): Sears,
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methods of analysis that are often inconsistent and usually erroneous.
Such doctrinal chaos creates the need for a careful reexamination of
the area.
Several features make the Sherman Act particularly attractive for
commercial bribery plaintiffs. 7 These features include access to federal courts, the Act's broad jurisdictional reach,8 and perhaps most
importantly, the Act's provision for recovery of treble damagesY Two
other statutes-the Robinson-Patman Act 10 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RIC0) 11-compete in providing these advantages. Both, however, contain various limitations not
found in the Sherman Act.
Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act proscribes the payment
of brokerage fees, commissions, and other compensation to agents in
connection with the sale of goods, except for services actually rendered.1 2 Although its principal purpose is to prevent the payment of
fraudulent commissions and fees as a means of price discrimination, 13
Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 110 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Cal. 19 53), appeal dismissed, 245 F.2d 67 (9th
Cir. 1956).
7. The immediate victims a re the principal of the bribed agent and the competitors that
were defeated through the practice. For a discussion of who has standing to brirtg a Sherman
Ac t claim for comme rcial bribery, see infra Section IliA.
8. The Sherman Act covers conduct unde rtaken anywhere within the U nited States as
long as the conduct either involves transactions in or substantially affects interstate commerce.
E.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980). It also
reaches activities outside the country if they affect Un ited States imports or exports. E.g.,
Un ited States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). For a discussion of
the Sherman Act's application to American companies engaged in overseas hribery, see
Mc Ma nis, Questionable Corporate Paymen ts Abroad: An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 2 15
(1976); Rill & Frank, Antitrust Consequences of United States Corporate Payments to Foreign
Officials: Applicability of Section 2(c) of the R obinson-Patman Act and Sections I a11d 2 of the
Sherman Act, 30 VAND. L. REv. 13 1 ( 1977). For conside ration of whether the Sherman A ct
can reach overseas bribery by foreign businesses when the bribes prejudice A merican
exporters, see G evurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign
Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade, 27 VA. J. INT' L L. 2 1 I ( 1987) .
9. 15 u.s.c. § 15 ( 1982).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
II. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
12. Section 2(c) of the R obi nson-Patman Act reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the coursc: of
such commerce, to pay or gra nt, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a
commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowa nce or discount in
lic:u thereof. except for ser vicc:s rendered in connection with the sale or purc hase
of goods. wares. or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or
to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such
intermediary is ac ting in fa ct for or in behalf, or is subjec t to the direct or indirect
control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such
compensation is so granted or paid .
15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
13. E.g.. FTC v. H enry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 169 (1960).
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courts repeatedly have held that it also prohibits bribery to procure a
sale of goods. 14 Because this section reaches only payments made in
connection with the sale of goods, it excludes payoffs to obtain a contract for services'j or a lease. 16 Further, it only reaches conduct by
defendants "engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce."17 Intrastate or foreign bribery thus may not be covered even
if the payoff affects trade between states or between the United States
and other nations. 18 Another problem lies in the decision of some
courts to limit standing under section 2(c) to the defeated competitor
and thereby deny recovery to the defrauded principal. 19 Finally, a
number of commentators have suggested that applying the RobinsonPatman Act to claims of commercial bribery would be a perversion of
the statute. 20 As a result, courts may back away from this
interpretation. 2 1
14. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 716 F .2d 245,
246 (4th Cir. 1983); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 696 (9th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc.,
351 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Fitch v. Kentucky·
Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12, 15 (6th Cir. 1943); cf May Dep't Sto re v. Graphic
Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1980) (action for commercial bribery may be brought
under section 2(c) if underlying transaction involved sale of goods, not sale of services).
15. May Dep't Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1980);
Stutzman Feed Serv., Inc. v. Todd & Sargent, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 417, 419 (S.D. Iowa 1972); see
also Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that
title insurance policies are not goods).
16. Rodman v. Haines, 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 61 ,074 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Moreover,
section 2(c) requires illegal payments to pass between the buyer and an agent of the seller or a
seller and an agent of the buyer. See Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367,
372 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that section 2(c) does not apply when the briber distributes goods as
an agent for the principal of the bribed employee instead of buying for resale); Cornwell
Quality Tools Co. v. C. T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding no liability under
section 2(c) for a manufacturer where persons receiving unearned commissions from the
manufacturer were not under the control of purchasers or acting on their behalf).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
18. See generally G evurtz, supra note 8, at 241-49 (discussing application of section 2(c) to
overseas bribery by foreign companies and intrastate bribery).
19. NL Indus., Inc. v. Gulf & W. Indus., 650 F. Supp. 1115, 1123-24 (D. K an. 1986);
Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Cywan, 511 F. Supp. 531, 533 (N.D . Ill. 1981); Computer Statistics,
Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339, 1347 (S.D. Tex. 1976). But see Municipality of Anchorage v.
Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 639 (D. Alaska 1982) (arguing that competitive injury
requirement "improperly restricts sta nding to sue" under section 2(c)).
20. See, e.g., 2 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND
MONOPOLIES § 12.01 (4th ed. 1982); Rill & Frank, supra note 8, at 144-49; Zamansky,
Preferential Treatm ent, Payoffs and the Antitrust Laws: Distortion of tire Competitive Process
Through Commercial Bribery, 83 CoM. L.J. 558, 563 (1978); Note, R estraint of TradeRobinson-Patman Act, Section 2{c)-Seller Who Bribes Buyer's Employee i s Liable in Treble
Damages to Competitor Who Lost Business Thereby, 79 H ARV. L. REV. 1531, 1533-34 (1966).
21. While the Supreme Court twice provided dicta favorable to the interpretation that
section 2(c) proscribes bribery, it never ruled on the question. See California Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); FfC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S.
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A variety of plaintiffs have recently discovered a potential treble
damage paradise in the RICO Act. These plaintiffs include victims of
commercial bribery. 22 Recovery under the RICO Act, however,
requires the surmounting of a series of steps that resemble something
of a scavenger hunt. 2 3 For example, a claim based upon one payoff
might not survive the requirement that the defendant be shown to
have engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. 24 Moreover, many
civil claims brought under the RICO Act far exceed the purposes of
the legislation. 25 Therefore, it may not be too long before Congress
retrenches on the private cause of action provided by the RICO Act. 26
This leaves the possibility of a treble damage claim based upon
the Sherman Act. Although victims of bribery have asserted claims
under both sections 1 and 2 of the Act, 27 section 2 is less useful
because it requires proof that the defendant acquired (or had a dangerous probability of acquiring) monopoly power. 28 Accordingly, this
166, 169 n.6 (1960); see also Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F .2d 367, 371-72
(3d Cir. 1985) (questioning whether Congress intended to sweep commercial bribery within
the ambit of section 2(c)); Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 630 F.2d 379, 38788 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusing to reach the question of whether commercial bribe<y violates
section 2(c)).
22. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 7 13 F.2d 1272, 1288 (7th Cir.
1983) (upholding the denial of a motion to dismiss RICO claim based on bribery); N L Indus.,
Inc. v. Gulf & W. Indus., 650 F. Supp. 1115, 1125 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding no liability under
RICO); Callan v. State Chern. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (finding
liability under RICO); see also Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp.
633, 644 (D. Alaska 1982) (denying plaintiff's motio n for summary judgment on RICO claim
based on commercial bribery due to inadequate factual record).
23. For an overview of the elements of a RICO Act violation, see Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan
Cos., Inc., 727 F .2d 648, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1984).
24. NL Indus. , Inc., 650 F. Supp. at 1127; Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537
F. Supp. 6, 12-13 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
25. See, e.g., Bast v. A. H. Robins Co., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 333, 335 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (RICO
claim against manufacturer of Dalkon shield and its insurer); Congregati on Beth Yitzhok v.
Brisman, 566 F. Supp. 555, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (dicta) (dispute between rival factions in a
Chassidic congregation).
26. See generally Comment, Congress Responds to Sedima· Is There a Contract Out on
Civil RICO?, 19 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 851 (1986) (discussing congressional responses to judicial
interpretations of RICO).
27. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1344 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am. , Inc., 532
F.2d 674, 687 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied , 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Parmelee Transp. Co.
v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 795 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1 961); Sterling Nelson &
Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (D. Idaho 1964), aff 'd on other grou11ds, 351
F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
28. Section 2 makes it unlawful to monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of trade
or commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Proof of monopolization requires showing the defendant
possessed mo nopoly power in the relevant market. E.g., United States v. E.l. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1958). The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he phrase
'attempt to monopolize' means the employment of methods, means and practices which would,
if successful, accomplish monopolization, and which, though fa lli ng short, nevertheless
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article focuses on section l, which prohibits the formation of combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 29 The first issue, therefore, is whether commercial bribery presents a combination or
conspiracy. Section IIA of this article explores this question. The
second and more difficult issue is whether commercial bribery can be
considered to be in restraint of trade. This is the subject of Section
liB. Finally, Section III briefly considers two other problems that
sometimes arise in cases that involve both commercial bribery and the
Sherman Act: Standing and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Before turning to an analysis of these elements, it is useful to
eliminate one source of confusion that surfaces in some cases in this
area: What precisely does one mean by commercial bribery? There is
a temptation to lump together under this label all payments or favors
made to agents or employees with the hope of gaining a competitive
advantage. 30 This, however, is far too broad and partially accounts
for the reluctance of some courts to recognize a cause of action for
commercial bribery under the Shennan Act.
To begin with, there is a key difference between engaging in bribery and providing legal gratuities, entertainment, or campaign contributions. Businesses may (and usually do) provide gratuities,
entertainment, campaign contributions, and the like in the hope of
disposing the recipient favorably toward them. There must be more
approach so close as to create a dangerous pro bability of it." American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946) (approving trial court's jury instructions). Most courts
interpret the dangerous probability stand ard as requiring proof that the defendant possessed
large, albeit not monopoly, power in the relevant market. See, e.g., Yoder Bros., Inc. v.
California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1368-69 (5th Cir. 1976) (proof that a defendant
acquired a twenty percent share of the market did not establish a dangerous probability that
the defendant could monopolize the market), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977): United States
v. Empire Gas, 537 F.2d 296, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1976) (proof that a defendant acquired a fifty
percent share of the market did not establish a dangerous probability that the defendant could
monopolize the market), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 11 22 (1977). But see Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474-75 (9th Cir.) (a dominant position in a market is "not necessarily
prerequisite to ability to attempt to monopolize an appreciable segment of interstate sales in
such" market), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 ( 1964). As discussed below, the greatest problem
with applying the Sherman Act against commercial bribery lies in establishing an adequate
effect on an overall market. See infra Section liB.
29. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in pan as follows: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwi se, or conspi racy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § I (1982).
30. See, e.g., Sterling Nelson & Sons. Inc., 235 F. Supp. at 400 ("This is a simple ~:ase of
buying influence, sometimes called commercial bribery . ... "); R. CALI.MAN, supra note 20,
§ 12.01 ("Commercial bribery may be defined as the offer of consideration to another's
employee or agent in the expectation that the offeree will, withoul fully informing his
principal, be sufficiently influenced by the offer to favor the offeror."); Zamansky. supra note
20, at 558 n.5 ("Commercial bribery refers to the business practice of buying the influence of a
person in a position of authority to induce bim to act in a manner favorable to the briber.").
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than this, however, to constitute a bribe. An agreement must exist
between the payor and the recipient that there will be a quid pro
quo. 31 This requirement is not only a traditional element under criminal bribery statutes, but it also makes a great deal of sense when dealing with claims under the Sherman Act. Few agents, or even persons
acting on their own behalf, base purchasing decisions entirely upon
price and quality. There will almost always be some desire to do business with those who seem more amicable. Attempting to prevent all
efforts to influence agents based upon factors other than price or quality thus would be a quixotic exercise. 32 The same is not true once an
agent specifically agrees to favor one company in exchange for personal consideration. In that event, other factors no longer blend
imperceptibly with price and quality competition. Instead, there is a
contract to abrogate that competition. Recognition of this difference
serves to explain in part and distinguish cases refusing to find a Sherman Act violation based upon the complaint that the successful recipient of a government franchise made campaign contributions to
important officials. 33
In addition to defining "bribery," one must specify what is meant
by "commercial bribery." Generally, writers use the term to distinguish payoffs to employees and agents in business dealings rather than
to government officials performing public duties. 34 This is both too
narrow and too broad. It is too narrow for present purposes because
there is no difference in competitive effect between a payoff to a government contracting official and to a private purchasing agent. It is
too broad for careful analysis because it groups together payments
31. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that
bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(l) requires "an explicit quid pro quo which need not exist if
only an illegal gratuity is involved'').
32. It could also fail to satisfy the requirement under section I that there be a combination
or conspiracy. For a discussion of whether commercial bribery fulfills this requirement, see
infra Section IIA.
33. See Bustop Shelters v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 994 (S.D. N.Y.
1981) (recognizing distinction); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp.
350, 358 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (same), ajf'd, 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Sun Valley
Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341, 342 (9th Cir. 1969) (distinguishing
acts taken by elected officials based on personal interest or outside influence from unlawful
acts). Of course, if the official agrees to favor the contributor in exchange for the money. then
the campaign contribution is a bribe.
34. See Note, Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, 46 MINI'i. L.
REV. 599, 599-60 (1962); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 180.00-180.08 (McKinney Supp. 1987)
(limiting definition of commercial bribery to employer-employee and principal-agent
relationships); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1979) (extending the definition of
bribery under Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, to include commercial bribery as well as
traditional common law bribery, which had previously been limited in application to public
officials).
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that may have a very different impact on competition. This article,
therefore, focuses on what, for want of a better term, I refer to as
''classic" commercial bribery: A payment to a private agent or government official made in exchange for the recipient's agreement to
have the recipient's principal procure goods or services from the
payor rather than from a competitor. 35

II.

COMMERCIAL BRIBERY AS A COMBINATION OR CONSPIRACY
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE UNDER THE SHE RMAN ACT

A.

Commercial Bribery as a Combination or Conspiracy

The first element of a section 1 violation, that there be a combination or conspiracy, poses little difficulty in the event of commercial
bribery. The requirement, of course, could be met if two or more
independent companies cooperate in a bribery scheme. 3 6 Also, the
use of an accomplice or subsidiary to make the payment might suffice,
depending upon the continued willingness of courts to recognize
intra-enterprise conspiracies.37 The conspiracy, however, need not be
manifested in either of these two manners because the agreement
between briber and recipient is the relevant combination that restrains
trade.
This point seems implicitly recognized by the decisions involving
commercial bribery claims based on section 1. Although courts disagree over whether such conduct constitutes a restraint of trade, none
suggests that there is not a conspiracy.38 Admittedly, the agreement
between briber and buyer's agent does not fit neatly into the traditional categories of either horizontal or vertical combinations (i.e.,
agreements between competitors or between parties in the distribution
35. In addition, the payment, to constitute a bribe, must be secret from the agent's
principal. E.g., Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edston Bros. Stores, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 334, 354, 406 A.2d
474, 485 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
36. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 702 (1962)
(evidence was sufficient fo r jury to decide whether parties violated Sherman Act by conspiring
to monopolize commerce in certain ore products); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S.
268, 276 (1927) (pa rties acting in combination violated Sherman Act by acquiring a monopoly
of interstate and foreign commerce in sisal).
37. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 ( 1984), the
Supreme Court held that the coordinated acts of a company and its wholly-owned subsidiary
do not constitute a combination o r conspiracy under section I. It left the issue open, however,
for non-wholly-owned subsidiaries. Whether agents or accomplices can be considered
conspirators for section I purposes depends upon their independence. S ee Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 148-50 ( 1968); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 469
(1962).
38. See also Federal Prescription Serv. , Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass 'n, 663 F .2d
253, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dicta) (suggesting that bribery of government officials creates a
conspiracy for purposes of section 1), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
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chain, respectively). 3 '~ Nothing in section 1, however, limits combinations to these two recognized categories. For example, numerous section 1 decisions recognize conspiracies between private firms and
government officials (even without bribery). 4 ° Further, the Supreme
Court has shown a willingness to go beyond these two categories, as
well as to stretch facts to find a section 1 combination, if sufficiently
anticompetitive conduct is present. 41 Additional support may be
found outside the antitrust context for the proposition that an agreement between a briber and a recipient constitutes a conspiracy. For
example, in Dennis v. Sparks, 42 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the bribery of a judge constituted a conspiracy in the
context of a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.43
B.

Commercial Bribery as a Restraint on Trade

Having concluded that commercial bribery constitutes a combination or conspiracy, the question becomes whether it can be considered to be in restraint of trade. If the briber creates a monopoly
through payoffs, an affirmative answer necessarily results. 44 Classic
39. For those requiring labels, perhaps such an agreement could be called "quasi-vertical."
40. See Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1981); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d
378, 379 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated mem., 435 U.S. 992, reinstated per curiam, 576 F.2d 696 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557
F.2d 580, 587 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated m em., 435 U.S. 992, reinstated per curiam, 583 F.2d 378
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 52 1 F .2d
1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975); Health Ca re Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 501 F.
Supp. 970, 992-93 (S. D. Iowa 1980); Mason City Center Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F . Supp.
737, 742 (N.D. Iowa 1979); see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943) ("(W]e have
no question of the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or
combination by others for restraint of trade .... "); cf United Mine Workers v. Pennington.
38 1 U.S. 657, 671 (1965) (no allegation that the public official was a co-conspirator).
41. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (finding a conspiracy under
section 1 between newspaper and newspaper carriers to solicit away plaintiff's subscribers,
who were also named as part of the conspiracy); Paller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368
U.S. 464, 469 ( 1962) (conspiracy between CBS and two individuals to buy a competing TV
station).
42. 449 U.S. 24 (I 980).
43. !d. at 31-32; see also People v. Wettengel, 98 Colo. 193, 58 P.2d 279 (193 5) (briber and
recipient cannot be convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery because bribery necessarily
requires a conspiracy); II C. J.S. Bribery § I (1938) ("(T]he elements of a conspiracy are
included within the substantive offense of agreeing to accept a bribe .... ").
44. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc.. 624 F.2d 1342, IJ52-5 3 (Sth
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 103 (198 1); see also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699-702 ( 1962) (evidence was sufficient to support a verdict that
defendants monopolized commerce in vanadium o xide): United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274
U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (complaint stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act by alleging
that defendants conspired to secure a monopoly of interstate and foreign commerce in sisal).
Some confusion exists, however, when the briber obtains but does not create a monopoly
position through payoffs. This occurs when, for example, the briber makes a payoff to gain an
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commercial bribery, however, usually does not produce a market
impact that would be sufficient to create a monopoly. Indeed, it may
only affect one sale. In that event, the analysis becomes more
complicated.
All contracts restrict trade to some extent because parties bound
to any agreement lose the freedom of action that they had possessed
before entering into the agreement. 45 Accordingly, courts have interpreted section 1 as prohibiting only those combinations that unreasonably restrain competition.46 Under this rule of reason,4 7 courts
examine the impact of a challenged contract to determine whether, on
balance, it promotes or destroys competition. 48 Sometimes, however,
the effect of the conduct is so plainly anticompetitive, and the practice
so lacking of any redeeming virtue, that no elaborate evaluation of its
impact is necessary in each case. Courts deem these practices illegal
per se.49 Examples of such practices include horizontal and vertical
price fixing, 50 horizontal division of markets between competitors, 5 1
certain tying arrangements, 52 and concerted refusals to deal. 5 3 Such a
per se rule is applied when courts have enough experience with a
exclusive franchise that would otherwise be awarded to another company. The monopoly
exists in that situation with or without the bribe. The payoff simply determines who gets the
monopoly. This led at least one court to conclude that such a payoff has no impact on
competition. Bustop Shelters v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 997 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); see also Par melee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.) (holding that the
award by railroads of an exclusive contract to transfer passengers and their baggage between
railroad terminal stations in Chicago to a new company did not violate Sherman Act even
though the new company's acquisition of the contract was facilitated by the wrongful conduct
of a public official), cert. denied , 368 U.S. 994 (196 1); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford.
Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1974) ("(A] successful franchise applicar.t does not
become a monopolist because another applicant is unsuccessful."), ajf'd. 516 F.2d 220 (7th
Cir. 1975). Such a conclusion, however, confuses the market for the services provided by the
franchisee with the market for the exclusive franchise. Bribery destroys competition in the
latter market. Whether this raises prices to consumers in the market for the services provided
by the franchisee, it deprives the franchisor of the advantages of free competition.
45. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.").
46. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U .S. 36, 49 (1977).
47 . See id.
48. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690
(1978).
49. S ee Northern Pac. Ry. v. U nited States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (195 8).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 2 18 (1940).
51. See, e.g. , United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 ( 1972).
52. See. e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp . Dist. N o.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2. 12·14 (1984) ("(T]hc
essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its
control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the
buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere.'').
53. S ee. e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 21 2 ( 1959) ("Group
boycotts, o r concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be
in the forbidden category.").
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given practice to predict confidently that the rule of reason would
condemn it. 54 When no such confidence exists, courts must examine
the competitive effect of the combination under the rule of reason by
analyzing the industry, the history of the restraint, and the reasons
why it was imposed. 55
This analytical framework suggests that in determining whether
commercial bribery constitutes a restraint of trade, courts must evaluate its effect on competition. By and large, however, courts faced with
commercial bribery claims under section 1 have not undertaken such
an analysis. Instead, they have applied one of four approaches to the
subject, three of which substitute oversimplified categorizations for
the sort of economic review demanded by the Sherman Act.
1.

THE "SQUARE PEG" APPROACH

One line of cases dealing with commercial bribery and the Sherman Act treats the statute as if it consists of a series of neatly defined
cubbyholes into which all violations must fit. Because commercial
bribery does not come within the traditional categories, courts subscribing to this view have concluded that it is beyond the Act's reach.
This formalistic analysis began with Parmelee Transportation Co. v.
Keeshin. 56
Parmelee arose out of a struggle between two companies that
each sought to obtain an exclusive contract from a group of railroads
for transporting passengers and baggage between train stations in Chicago. 57 Instead of having paid an agent of the railroads, as would
have been the case if the situation involved classic commercial bribery, the defendant allegedly bribed the Chairman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). 58 The Chairman, in turn, offered the
railroads favorable consideration of matters pending before the ICC if
the railroads granted the contract to the defendant. 59 After the
defendant received the contract, the plaintiff sued. At trial, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim as not cognizable under
54. E.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. I, 9-10 (1979); see
also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.l6 (1977) (''Cases that do
not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are
not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify
them.").
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
Id. at 795-96.
!d. at 796.

Id.
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either section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. 60 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision. 6 1
Given these facts, the court of appeals' decision may well have
been correct. 62 The Chairman of the ICC may have offered the railroads more favorable treatment than they would have received from a
neutral commission. If so, the bribe did not raise the effective price
paid by the railroads or in any other way interfere with their
obtaining the advantages of free competition. Rather, it simply provided them with an added, albeit illegal, benefit from accepting the
defendant's bid. Admittedly, this gave the defendant an unfair advantage over a more scrupulous competitor. The same may be said, however, if the defendant had engaged in illegal conduct that minimized
its costs and allowed it to offer a lower price.63 Yet in neither event
would there be a restraint of trade. A different situation would have
been presented if the Chairman had threatened the railroads with
worse treatment than they reasonably had expected from a neutral
commission. In that case, the pressure exerted is similar in economic
effect to that of an illegal tying arrangement. 64
Whatever the economic impact of the bribe in Parmelee, it is very
different from that of classic commercial bribery. Unfortunately, the
court never really analyzed the impact of the payoff, but simply characterized it as irrelevant to the Sherman Act. 65 The result invited
subsequent courts to read the opinion as holding that all commercial
bribery was outside the statute's reach. This invitation was not long
ignored.
60. Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 186 F . Supp. 533, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1960), a.lf'd, 292
F.2d 794 (7th Cir.), cere. denied, 368 U.S. 944 ( 1961).
61. Parmelee, 292 F .2d a t 805.
62. The First Circuit criticized Parmelee in Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981),
pointing o ut that the two cases relied upon in Parmelee-Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940), and Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freights, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 ( 1961)-were inapposite. Corey, 641 F.2d at 36 & n.5. The Apex decision, in
which the Supreme Court decided whether a labor strike could violate the Sherman Act , is
confined to the special relationship between organized labor and the antitrust laws. S ee Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, .2 13 n.7 (1959). Indeed, the Apex Court
indicated that section I is concerned with combinations that raise prices or deprive purchasers
of the advantages of free competition. See Apex, 310 U.S. a t 500-01. This is the precise effect
of classic commercial bribery. Noerr involved lobbying efforts to obtain favorable legislation
and does not immunize bribery. See infra Section IIIB.
63. For example, a company might seek a competitive advantage through cutting costs by
ignoring health and safety regulations.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
65. See Parmelee, 292 F.2d at 804.
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In Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc. ,66 the United
States District Court for the District of Idaho confronted a case
involving classic commercial bribery. The defendant in the case
bribed an official of the Idaho Department of Fish and Game to influence the department to buy the defendant's fish feed. 67 After this
came to light, a competing seller sued. The plaintiff prevailed upon its
claim under section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act,6 8 but the district court rejected the Sherman Act claim.6 9 Citing Parmelee, the
court stated:
This is not the type of misconduct within t he purview of the concepts of a combination in restraint of trade or monopoly as used in
the Sherman Act. . . . [T]he Sherman Act must be interpreted in
the light of well understood common law doctrines relating to
monopolies and restraints of trade such as contracts for the restriction or suppression of competition in the market, agreements to fix
prices, divide marketing territories, apportion customers, restrict
production and the like. Nothing of that kind occurred here. 70

Satisfied with its victory under the Robinson-Patman Act, the
plaintiff opted not to appeal the Sherman Act decision. 7 1 Thus, the
authority of Sterling Nelson & Sons is limited. Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit chose to follow its reasoning in Calnetics Corp. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc. 72
Calnetics manufactured air conditioning systems for Volkswagen
automobiles. 73 After Volkswagen acquired a competing air conditioning manufacturer, Calnetics sued on the basis of various alleged antitrust violations.7 4 Volkswagen counterclaimed, alleging that
Calnetics secretly paid the service manager of an independent auto
parts distributor a commission on every air conditioner the distributor
bought from Calnetics.75 Relying on Sterling Nelson & Sons, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment that
dismissed Volkswagen's claims under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. 76 The court held that commercial bribery "standing alone" does
66. 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho 1964), aff'd on other grounds. 351 F .2d 851 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied , 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
67. /d. at 395-96.
68. /d. at 396.
69. !d. at 400.
70. ld.
71. See R angen, Inc. v. Sterling N elson & Sons, Inc., 35 1 F. 2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1 966).
72. 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 940 (197 6).
73. !d. at 679-80.
74. !d.
75. ! d. at 680.
76. Id. at 688. The court also cited United States v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 380 U.S.
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not violate the statute. 77
Calnetics and Sterling Nelson & Sons, however, proceed from a
fundamentally wrong premise. By its language and through numerous interpretations, section 1 of the Sherman Act is not a statute that
reaches only a closed set of traditionally recognized restraints on
trade. 78 Rather, it is a flexible act that requires courts to assess the
economic impact of combinations affecting competition. Calnetics
and Sterling Nelson & Sons undertook no such assessment. If they
157 (1965), and Norville v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 303 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. !962). See id. at
687. Neither case, however, is particularly relevant. Boston & Maine contains a statement that
bribery "is more remote from an antitrust frame of reference [than from a conflict of interest
statute]." 380 U.S. at 162. But the Court made that statement in reviewing whether a person
receiving a bribe acquired a "substantial interest" in the company making the payment within
the meaning of section 10 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1982). See id. Section 10 is a
very narrow provision that prohibits common carriers from buying from related entities
without competitive bidding. Thus, the Court's statement is not a general critique on the
applicability of antitrust laws to bribery. See Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d at 857 ("We do
not regard the [Court's] observation [in Boston & Maine] as a definitive ruling that under no
set of circumstances could commercial bribery be violative of any antitrust law."). It also does
not show any careful analysis concerning the competitive impact of classic commercial bribery.
Norville is even less relevant. It was an action brought under section 2(c) of the RobinsonPatman Act in which (despite the plaintiff's use of the term "commercial bribery") there was
no bribe. See Norville, 303 F.2d at 282.
77. Calnetics, 532 F.2d at 687. The court declined to suggest what other conduct
combined with commercial bribery would constitute a violation. Id. at 687 n.20. In
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 (D. Alaska 1982), a
federal district court in Alaska dutifully followed the Ninth Circuit opinion in Calnecics.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 110 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed, 245 F.2d
67 (9th Cir. 1956), an earlier district court opinion in the Ninth Circuit, appeared to involve
cla~sic commercial bribery. The defendant gave kickbacks to Sears' Los Angeles advertising
manager in connection with engraving work under a contract with the defendant. Blade, 110
F. Supp. at 98. In dismissing Sears' claim under section I of the Sherman Act, the court
explained that the complaint contained no allegation of an effect on interstate commerce by
any "actual restraint. " ld. at 100-01. (The opinion is unclear as to whether the court found no
impact on interstate commerce for purposes of jurisdiction or no restraint of trade for purposes
of a substantive violation.) According to the court, the complaint could not allege an impact
on interstate commerce unless it alleged that Sears raised its prices to its customers. ld. The
court ignored whether Sears, as a consumer itself, paid more or otherwise lost the advantages
of competition between suppliers of engraving services. The court did state that Sears made no
allegation of price discrimination between itself and other customers of the defendant-a
virtually irrelevant point. ld. at 100. The court also stated that if the scheme had any effect
upon Sears, with its multimillion dollar business, it was ''too remote'' for the purposes of the
Sherman Act. ld. at 101. Under this reasoning, firms would be free, for example, to fix price~
as long as they make only small sales to very large customers.
78. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359·60 (1933) ("As a
charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."); see also George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v .
Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 560 (1st Cir. 1974) ("As the legislative history of
the Sherman Act reveals, the draftsmen recognized that there was no finite catalogue of unfair
practices which could be the devices of a conspiracy to restrain trade."), cert. denied. 421 U.S.
1004 (1975).
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had done so, they might have realized that the restraint created by
classic commercial bribery is much closer to the traditional categories
than they initially suspected.
2.

THE UNFAIR PRACTICE APPROACH

Surprisingly, the courts in Parmelee, Sterling Nelson & Sons, and
Calnetics overlooked one obvious category into which commercial
bribery might fit. They could have treated it as another unfair trade
practice that under some circumstances would violate the Sherman
Act. The Fifth Circuit, in Associated Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways, Inc. ,19 adopted this very approach.
Associated and Page competed in the business of outfitting private jets with avionics.80 Associated sued Page for violating sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act by engaging in a series of unfair tactics. 8 1
These included misappropriating Associated's trade secrets, filing
spurious lawsuits against Associated, and secretly paying Associated's
employees to perform disloyal acts while still employed by the company and thereupon to quit and join PageY Most significantly, Page
also repeatedly bribed purchasing agents and officials to obtain both
domestic and foreign contracts. 83 In affirming a jury verdict for Associated,84 the Fifth Circuit held that the aggregate effect of Page's
actions was sufficient to violate both sections of the Act. 85
To understand the reasoning and limits of this decision, it is necessary to review the shifting positions that courts have taken over the
question of when the Sherman Act forbids unfair trade practices.
Such a review begins with Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury
Corp. 86 Mitchell Woodbury and Pick-Barth both sold kitchen equipment to restaurants and similar institutions. 87 Mitchell Woodbury
operated in the New England area. 88 Pick-Barth was a dominant
force in the national market, but maintained only a limited presence
in New England. 89 Pick-Barth enticed two of Mitchell Woodbury's
key employees to leave their jobs and head an expanded Pick-Barth
79. 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied , 450 U.S. 1030 (198 1).
80. !d. a t 1345-46.
!! 1. !d. at 1348.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

/d. a t 1346-47.
/d. at 1347-48.
/d. at I 344.
/d. at I J 50, 1356.
57 F .2d 96 ( 1st Cir.), cert. denied , 286 U.S. 552 (1 9 32).
/d. at 100.
/d.
/d.
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operation in Boston. 90 The two employees took with them Mitchell
Woodbury customer lists and other trade secrets. 91 They then solicited away many of Mitchell Woodbury's other employees and customers and thus caused a temporary disruption of its operations. 92 The
jury in the resulting lawsuit found that the defendants intended by
these acts to eliminate Mitchell Woodbury as a competitor in the
kitchen equipment field, but had not achieved that goal. 93 Nevertheless, the district court granted judgment for Mitchell Woodbury,94
and the First Circuit affirmed. 95 The First Circuit held that if the
purpose of a conspiracy is to eliminate through unfair competition a
competitor with a sizable share of the market, the conspiracy violates
section 1 even if it fails in its objective and does not cause an unreasonable restraint on competition. 96 In essence, the opinion treats such
a conspiracy as a per se violation of the section.
While at least one other circuit followed the Pick-Barth doctrine,97 commentators reacted critically, pointing to several flaws in
the doctrine. 98 To begin with, the doctrine attacks what is often
90. !d . at 101.
91. /d.
92. Jd.
93. Jd. at 99.
94. !d.
95. !d. at 103.
96. !d. at I 02.
97. The First Circuit followed Pick-Barth in Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co., 284
F .2d 879 (1st Cir. 1960), and the Tenth Circuit followed it in Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v.
Pioneer Distributing Co., 353 F.2d 618 (lOth Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U .S. 945 (1966). In
Allied H eel, the Atlantic Heel Company complained of unfair practices by the defendants that
included enticing away its key employees and sales representatives, misappropriating its trade
secrets. disparaging its products, instituting bad faith litigation against it, interfering with its
supply of raw materials, and the defendants' passing themselves off as affiliated with it. 284
F .2d at 879-80. The First Circuit reaffirmed Pick-Barth and held that this conduct constituted
a per se violation of section 1. /d. at 884. In Perryton Wholesale, the defendant solicited away
a number of the plaintiff's employees. 353 F .2d at 620-21. The employees then enco uraged
the plaintiff's customers to switch to the defendant (often before the employees officially
terminated their employment with the plaintiff). !d. According to the Tenth Circuit, this
conduct was a per se violation of section I. !d. at 622.
A number of district court decisions have also followed Pick-Barth to a greater or l~ sser
e.xtent. See, e.g .. Snyder v. H oward Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 412 F . Supp. 724, 729 (S.D.
Ill. 1976); Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Rizzuto, 410 F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Van Dyke
Ford. Inc. v. Ford Mo tor Co., 399 F. Supp. 277. 283 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Tower Tire & Auto
Center, Inc. v. Atlentic Ric hfield Co., 392 F . Supp. 1098, 1107 (S.D . Tex. 1975); C. Albert
Sauter Co. v. RichardS. Sauter Co., 368 F. Supp. 501, 513 (E. D . Pa. 1973); Vogue Instrument
Corp. v. Lem Instruments Corp. , 40 F.R.D. 497 , 500 & n.4 (S.D .N .Y. 1966).
98. See, e.g. , Boone, Single-Corporation Competiti~e Torts and the Sherman Act: A
Projection Based upon a R e ~iew of the Albert Pick, Atlantic Heel, and Perryton Cases, 2 GA. L.
REV. 372 (1968); Yoerg, Should a Trade Secrets Misappropriation Claim Lie in the Procrustean
Antitrust Bed?, 22 ANTITRUST BuLL. I (1977); Comment, A Reexamination of Pick-Barth Per
Se Illegality Under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 38 U. PtTI. L. REv. 87 ( 1976);
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ing the drafters of a university construction fund report to give conclusions unfavorable to Whitten, attempting to make gifts to influence
a public works employee, 109 sneaking an advance look at a Whitten
bid, and attempting to induce a distributor of contracts information to
cease providing Whitten with data tailored to its needs. 110 Despite
these practices, the district court granted judgment for the defendants, 111 and the First Circuit affirmed. 112 The court of appeals held
that, although such unfair tactics could violate section 1 under some
circumstances, they are not illegal per se. 113 When confronting the
Pick-Barth line of cases, the court distinguished them on their facts
and rejected their approach. 114 Having refused to apply a per se rule,
the court of appeals upheld the district court's findings that the effect
of Paddock's unfair practices was insufficient to constitute a violation
under the rule of reason standard. 1 15
Disowned by its own circuit, every other circuit that has considered the Pick-Barth doctrine since Whitten has rejected it. 116 This
raises a new question, however. When do unfair practices become
illegal under a rule of reason analysis? The Fifth Circuit answered
this question in Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries.117 Northwest was a distributor in the Dallas area of power fasteners used in construction. 118 Oroark, a manufacturer of these tools,
109. This case, therefore, involved an unsuccessful offer of a classic commercial bribe. Such
an abortive effort, however, achieves neither a conspiracy nor a restraint of trade and cannot
constitute a violation of section I.
110. Whitten, 508 F.2d at 555-56.
Ill. !d. at 550.
112. !d. at 562.
113. !d. at 560.
114. The court stated that the practices in Pick-Barth , Atlantic Heel, and Perryton involved
efforts to destroy the respective plaintiffs as viable competitors rather than mere attempts to
gain a larger market share through unfair means. Whitten, 508 F.2d at 561-62. A comparison
of the practices in the cases, however, suggests the spuriousness of this distinction. Enticing
away key employees and stealing customer lists- the principal activities in Pick-Barrh-are
fund amentally efforts to win in the marketplace. On the other hand, Padd ock's effort to cut off
Whitten's access to contract data seems to have been designed as an attack against Whitten as
a competito r. Indeed, the court itself does not appear convinced by this distinction. See id. at
562.
115. See id. Whitten had actually increased its sales volume. !d.
116. See A. H. Cox & Co. v. Star Machinery Co. , 653 F.2d 1302, 1305 & n.S (9th Cir. 1981);
Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1980); Franklin Music
Co. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 616 F .2d 528, 541-42 & n.l 8 (3d Cir. 1979); Sti fel.
Nicolaus & Co., Inc. v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 578 F .2d 1256, 1261 (8th Cir. 1978);
Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., 576 F. 2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied.
439 U.S. 1116 (1979); El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 551 F. Supp. 626. 632 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Merkle Press, Inc. v. Merkle, 519 F. Supp. 50, 53, 54 (D . Md. 1981 ).
11 7. 576 F .2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
11 8. /d. at 85.
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grew dissatisfied with Northwest. 119 It secretly persuaded Northwest's sales manager to join another firm, Bosco Fastening Service
Center, which then began to distribute Omark's product. 120 Bosco
hired other Northwest employees, including one "who took with her a
valuable customer list." 121 Bosco and Omark thereupon launched a
campaign to make false and disparaging remarks about Northwest to
Northwest's customers. 122 Northwest sued Omark and Bosco alleging a violation of section 1, but the district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. 123 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, declining
to follow Pick-Barth. 124 Instead, it held that unfair practices violate
section 1 only if they provide the defendant some degree of monopoly
power. 125 The court borrowed from the law of mergers to establish a
standard for gauging when the defendant achieved impermissible
power. 126 If a merger between the plaintiff and defendant would violate section 1 by creating too great a concentration in the market, then
the section would also prohibit the defendant from engaging in unfair
trade practices that harm the plaintiff enough to cause the same concentration. 127 Because the defendants' activities in Northwest Power
Products left the market less concentrated than it was before, no violation resulted. 128
This is where the law stood when the Fifth Circuit, in Associated
Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 129 confronted a case of unfair
practices that included classic commercial bribery. The court in Associated Radio simply treated classic commercial bribery as another
unfair practice and applied the test established in Northwest Power
Products. 130 The court noted that Page had been a potential entrant
into a highly concentrated market 131 and held that Page would have
violated the antitrust laws if it attempted to acquire Associated by
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
ld.
Id.
/d.
/d.
!d.
Id.
Id.
!d.
Id.

at 85-86.
at 86.

at 85.
at 89.
at 89-90.

129. 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
130. See id. at 1351-53. The court embellished the test somewhat by breaking it into two
parts: "(!) a market effect that would be prohibited under the law of mergers; and (2) other
conduct by defendant that threatens Sherman Act values." Id. at 1351.
131. Id. at 1352. At the time of Page's acts, a total of five companies competed in the
relevant avionics market, with Associated holding a fifty percent share of that market. /d.
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merger. 132 Because Page obtained at least the same market share previously enjoyed by Associated, while at the same time raising its
prices and profits, the court was satisfied that Page gained substantial
power through its unfair conduct. 133
Under the reasoning of Associated Radio, classic commercial
bribery can violate section 1 if a briber successfully uses it to drive out
competitors and thereby achieve a significant increase in market concentration. 134 Although the Associated Radio approach is an
improvement on the "square peg" line of cases, it is also unnecessarily
restrictive. It ignores critical differences between classic commercial
bribery and other unfair trade practices. First, unlike such practices
as misappropriating trade secrets or disparagement, commercial bribery, by its very nature, requires the involvement of more than one
entity. A bribe does not occur without an agreement between the
briber and the recipient. More importantly, classic commercial bribery lacks the short-term procompetitive effects of other unfair trade
practices. In fact, and this is the fundamental point that Associated
Radio missed, classic commercial bribery destroys competition and
leads to monopoly pricing irrespective of its effect on competitors, and
thus on market structure. 135 Associated Radio illustrates this point.
As proof of Page's monopoly power, the court pointed to its increased
prices and profits. 136 Page's profits were particularly high on foreign
contracts in instances when there was also evidence of bribery. 137 In
suggesting that the aggregate of Page's unfair practices gave it a market share sufficient to exact this income, 138 the court missed a seemingly obvious point. The bribes, not market share, allowed Page to
charge prices and realize profits above competitive levels.
132. See id. at 1352-53 (citing FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U .S. 568 (1967)).
133. !d. The court focused specifically upon the impact of Page's bribes in noting that two
or three of the avionics contracts that Page obtained through this tactic could keep a
competitor in business for a year. !d. at 1353, 1355.
134. Such an extensive market impact may not be that rare. Bribery seems particularly
likely to be found in concentrated industries in which the entrants are competing for a few
critical contracts (e.g., aircraft and defense). See T. G LADWIN & I. WALTER, MULTINATIONALS UNDER FIRE 313-14 (1980); Note, Effective Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561, 564 (1980).
135. For further discussion of the anticompetitive effect of classic commercial bribery, see
infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
136. See Associated Radio, 624 F .2d at 1352 & n.19. On each airplane that Page outfitted,
Page increased its prices an average of more than twenty percent above the prices Associated
had charged before Page's entry. !d. at 1352 n.l9. This allowed Page to obtain twice the
profits that Associated had realized. /d. at 1353 n. l9.
137. !d. at 1348, 1353 n.l9. Page increased prices on contracts with foreign governments
even more than on domestic contracts and tripled the profits that Associated had earned on
foreign contracts. !d.
138. See id. at 13 53.
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THE RECIPROCAL DEALING AND TIE-IN ANALOGY

In City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 139 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia suggested yet a
third way of approaching commercial bribery under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. This decision arose out of an antitrust suit brought by
the city of Atlanta. 140 One of the defendants, Western Contracting,
asserted a counterclaim against the city and a crossclaim against
another firm, F.O. Thacker Contracting, for allegedly bribing Atlanta
officials in violation of section 1. 141 Because of the bribe, city officials
insisted that Western award a subcontract to Thacker for concrete
work on a number of paving projects involved in building a new
terminal at the city's airport. 142 When Western refused (preferring to
do the concrete work itself), the officials awarded the construction
contract to a higher bidder that subsequently granted a subcontract to
Thacker. 143 In denying motions to dismiss Western Contracting's
counterclaim and crossclaim, 144 the district court distinguished
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc ., 145 Sterling Nelson &
Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 146 and Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin, 147 which held that " allegations of commercial bribery, standing
alone, will not support a claim for relief " under section 1. 148 The
court held that these cases were not controlling because Western
alleged more than mere bribery. 149 Specifically, Western alleged that
Thacker and the city had engaged in a combination or conspiracy to
supplant competition for the concrete work. 150 The court's effort to
distinguish these cases is specious, however, because any claim of classic commercial bribery necessarily implies the existence of a combination or conspiracy between the briber and the bribed agent to supplant
competition. 151 Of more immediate interest, the court also suggested
139. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,527 (N.D . Ga. 1982).
140. See id.
141. /d.
142. /d.

143. /d.
144. ld. The court shou ld have dismissed Western Contracting's claim against Atlanta
because the city was a victim of, rather than a party to, the commercial bribery.
145. 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 940 (1976).
146. 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho 1964), aff"d on other grounds, 35 1 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
147. 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
148. City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 64,527 (N.D.
Ga. 1982). For further discussion of Calnetics, Sterling Nelson & Sons, and Parmelee, see
supra Section liB.
149. /d .
150. / d.
151. See supra Section IIA .
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that the restraint created by the bribe might be "somewhat akin" to
that resulting from tying arrangements or reciprocal dealing.m
Tying refers to the practice of conditioning the sale of one product upon the purchase of a second, or tied, product. 153 Such an
arrangement would exist, for example, if a manufacturer of tabulating
machines required anyone desiring to buy its equipment to purchase
its punch cards as well. 154 The Supreme Court has long held certain
tie-ins to constitute a per se violation of section 1. 155 Not all package
sales are illegal, however. To violate the Sherman Act, there must be
two distinct products, the seller must possess sufficient economic
power in the tying product's market to cause purchaser acceptance of
the tied product, and the tie must foreclose a substantial volume of
commerce to other sellers. 156 Unsurprisingly, each of these three
requirements involves considerable economic analysis despite the per
se label.
Reciprocal dealing occurs when one party agrees to make
purchases from the other on the condition that the other will make
purchases from it. 157 For instance, a grocery store chain, which owns
a subsidiary that produces dehydrated onion and garlic, would be
engaging in reciprocity if it bought from food processors only on condition that they buy onion and garlic from its subsidiary. 158 The jurisprudence governing reciprocity under section I of the Sherman Act is
of much more recent vintage than that respecting tie-ins. 159 Thus, the
legal status of reciprocal dealing under this section is much less certain. Nevertheless, several recent lower court decisions suggest that
certain forms of reciprocal dealing, like tie-ins, are per se violations of
section 1. 160 Reciprocity can range from a mere unilateral hope that
152. See City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982·1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1:64,527 (N.D.
Ga. 1982). The analogy between commercial bribery and reciprocal dealing appears to have
been first suggested by Jacob H. Zamansky. S ee Zamansky, supra note 20, at 569-71.
!53. See, e.g. , Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
154. See International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 133-34 (1936).
155. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hasp., 466 U.S. at 13-14.
156. See id. at 12-18; Northern Pac. R y. v. United States, 356 U.S. I. II (1958); TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610-14 (1953).
157. See, e.g., Zamansky, supra note 20, at 569 n.137.
158. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 595-97 (1965).
159. For some years, the Federal Trade Commission has attacked reciprocal dealing under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982), and under section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated F oods Corp., 380 U.S.
592 (1965); In re California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1 937); In re Mechanical Mfg. Co. ,
16 F.T.C. 67 (1932). The case of United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F . Supp. 36
(S .D. N.Y. 1966), appears to be the first to apply section l against reciprocal dealing, although,
like Consolidated Foods, it arose in the context of a challenged merger.
160. See, e.g., Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1982); Spartan Grain &
Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 381 (1979); Columbia
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patronizing a firm will influence it to order one's own product, to a
mutually desired agreement for cross purchases, all the way to a coercive insistence by a firm with market power over patronage. While
the first practice is clearly legal, 161 and the status of the second is
subject to much uncertainty and debate, 162 a number of courts have
held that coercive reciprocal dealing should receive the same analysis
that applies to tie-ins. 163
At first glance, the analogy between tie-ins, reciprocal dealing,
and classic commercial bribery seems persuasive. In each case, the
practice undermines competition based purely on the merits of price
and quality by introducing an "alien factor" into the buyer's decisionmaking.164 Ultimately, however, the parallel is not complete and the
analogy produces a misleading analysis. Tie-ins and reciprocal dealing are illegal when they involve the use of monopoly power in one
market to leverage an advantage in another. 165 This means that
before declaring such practices per se illegal, the court must evaluate
the defendant's market power. Further, tying and reciprocity are not
devoid of any offsetting procompetitive benefits. 166 It is therefore reasonable for courts to prohibit these practices only when they foreclose
a substantial volume of commerce. Classic commercial bribery is difNitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi,
S.p.A. v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 61,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Ryals v. National Car Rental Sys., 404 F. Supp. 481 (D. Minn. 1975).
161. See United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903, 908-09 (W.D. Mo. 1975)
(holding that unilateral action does not violate section 1), a.IJ'd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36,
66 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (A unilateral hope for reciprocity does not even fulfill the combination or
conspiracy requirement for a section 1 violation.).
162. See Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 14 (4th Cir. 1971 ); see also
Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ~ 61 ,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding that a party to noncoercive dealing may not recover
from the other for the violation). Compare United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F.
Supp. 36, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Mutual reciprocity, like tie-ins, should be treated as a per se
violation.) and Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REV. 873,
882 ( 1964) (A per se pro hibition is appropriate for reciprocal dealing agreements.) with
Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 552, 573-74 (1965) (Reciprocal d ealing d oes not "appear to offer any targets for the
guns of antitrust.").
163. See. e.g., Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F .2d 1203, 1220 (9th Cir. 1982): Spartan
Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831
( 1979).
164. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965).
165. There is some authority that reciprocal dealing may be illegal even if it does not
involve such leverage. See cases cited supra note 162. The uncertainty surrounding this issue,
however. renders it a poor fo undation upon which to base an analogy.
166. See. e.g., Bowman. Tying Arrangements and the L everage Problem, 67 YALE LJ . 19,
21 (1957); Lorie & Halpern, Conglomerates: The Rhetoric and the Evidence, I 3 J . L. & EcoN.
149, 151-52 (1970).
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ferent on both counts. It destroys competition on the merits irrespective of a defendant's market power and has no countervailing
procompetitive utility. 167 In light of these differences, the viability of
a cause of action for commercial bribery under section 1 should not
depend on the claimant's ability to show monopoly power or substantial foreclosure of commerce in a given market.

4.

BACK TO THE BASICS: A FRESH LOOK AT WHETHE R
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY VIOLATES THE SHE RMAN ACT

Instead of searching for a convenient cubbyhole, the best
approach is to evaluate whether commercial bribery, on its own merits, constitutes a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In Bunker
Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc. , 168 the Seventh Circuit
indicated a willingness to do just that. Bunker R amo did not involve
classic commercial bribery; rather, United Business bribed a Bunker
Ramo employee as part of a fraudulent invoice scheme. 169 Under the
scheme, the employee ordered forms from United Business in excess
of Bunker Ramo's needs. 170 United Business did not deliver the
excess forms, but the employee signed false delivery receipts indicating it had. 171 United Business then billed Bunker Ramo for quantities
never delivered. 172 After discovering the fraud, Bunker Ramo tried
everything to recover treble damages. First, it sued for violation of
section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 173 The district court, however, determined that Bunker Ramo lacked standing and thus the
court dismissed the complaint. 17 4 Bunker Ramo then filed a second
complaint alleging violations of both section 1 of the Sherman Act
and the RICO Act. 175 The district court denied United Business'
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. 176
On interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that Bunker Ramo failed to state a claim under section
!67. See inf ra n otes 186-94 a nd accompanying text.
168. 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983).
169. /d. at 127 5.
170. ld.
171. ld.
172. Jd.
17 3. Bunker R amo Corp. v. Cywan, 511 F. Supp. 531, 532 (N.D . Ill. 198 1).
I 74. /d. at 534. The court h eld that because Bunker Ramo and U nited Business were not
competitors, Bunker Ramo had no stand in g to assert a claim against United Business under
section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act. See id. at 533-34. For a discussion of the standing
requirement of section 2(c), see supra text accom panying note 19.
175. Bunker Ramo, 71 3 F.2d at 1275-76.
176. Jd. at 1276.
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1. 177 In doing so, however, the court did not reject the claim outright

as falling outside the traditional categories of violations. Rather, the
court analyzed the competitive impact of the alleged conduct to determine if it was the type of conduct that the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent. 178 First, it considered whether the conduct could
be a per se violation of the section. Bunker Ramo argued that United
Business' conduct amounted to price fixing that forced Bunker Ramo
to pay an artificially high, noncompetitive price. 179 As discussed
below, this is the precise effect of classic commercial bribery. 1 ~ 0
Unfortunately for Bunker Ramo, it did not allege that it was the victim of classic commercial bribery. Instead, it simply claimed that, as
a result of bribery, it paid for forms it never received. 18 1 As the court
pointed out, this is "more akin" to a scheme to defraud than a price
fixing scheme} 82 The court then concluded that because the challenged practice did not have a sufficiently evident anticompetitive
impact and because the courts have had little experience in dealing
with such conduct under the antitrust laws, the conduct did not merit
per se treatment. 183 The court next analyzed Bunker Ramo's claim
under the rule of reason. 184 Finding no allegation of any anticompetitive effect from United Business' conduct, the court concluded that
Bunker Ramo failed to state a cause of action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 185
The Bunker Ramo court showed a refreshing willingness to consider the competitive impact of commercial bribery. It also reached
the correct result upon the facts before it, as the scheme amounted to
little more than simple theft and lacked any impact on competition.
The same cannot be said about classic commercial bribery. 186
177. /d. at 1285. The court of appeals upheld the lower court's holding that Bunker
Ramo's second suit was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. / d. at 1279. The court of
appeals held that because the trial court dismissed the first suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, any consideration of the merits by that court had no res judicata effect. / d .
178. See id. at 1283; see also supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text (discussing the
framework that courts use in analyzing claims alleging Sherman Act violations).
179. See Bunker Ramo, 713 F .2d at 1284.
180. See infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
181. See Bunker Ramo, 113 F.2d at 1284.
182. /d.
183. /d. at 1284-85.
184. See id. at 1285.
185. ! d.
186. The Third Circuit recently confronted a claim under section I involving commercial
bribery in Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1985). As in
Bunker Ramo, the court analyzed the claim under a basic section I approach, although with
more questio nable results. Also, like Bunker Ramo, the payoffs did not constitute classic
commercial bribery. Seaboard competed with Manufacturers Reps Company in the wholesale
distribution of roofing felt made by Congoleum. /d. at 368-69. At the instigation of
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To understand the competitive impact of classic commercial
bribery, one must consider why firms engage in the practice. An inefficient firm may pay off a purchasing agent or government official
because it cannot obtain the business based upon the price or quality
of its product. Even if the firm is efficient and could therefore compete on the basis of price or quality, it may still engage in bribery due
to one of two motivations. It may be a defensive effort to respond to
the extortion of the agent or to respond to bribery by other firms.
Alternatively, the firm may give the payoff in lieu of lowering prices
or increasing quality in order to reap monopoly profits. 187 In each
Congoleum's sales manager, Manufacturers began paying him various "consulting fees." /d.
at 369. In exchange, he arranged for Manufac turers to get favorable treatment from
Congoleum , including an agreement to sell felt on commission rather than by ta king title and
reselling. /d. Once the relationship between Congoleum's sales manager and Manufacturers
was established, " Seaboard 's longstanding relationship with Congoleum deteriorated.'' Jd. As
a result, Seaboard sued the sales manager, Congoleum, and Manufacturers alleging violatio ns
of both section I of the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act . The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. ld.
a t 375.
Seaboard a rgued that the scheme amounted to a group boycott that violated the Sherman
Act under either a per se or rule of reason a pproach. /d. at 373. The court, however, treated
Congoleum's favoritism of Manufacturers as a unilateral action by Congoleum to restructure
its distribution arrangements, and thus found that it did not constitute an illegal group
boycott. /d. at 374; see M onsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)
("There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and
non te rminated distributo rs were acting independently."). Turning to a rule of reaso n analysis,
the Third Circuit upheld the district court's findings that Congoleum increased intrab rand
competition by ma king Manufacturers a commission agent because th is action a llowed
Congoleum to lower prices and compete more e ffect ively with oth er producers. Seaboard, 770
F.2d at 375.
The court's analysis is problematic because it ignores t he br ibery. In large part, Seaboard
invited this omission by naming Congoleum as a de fen dant and attacking Congoleum's dealing
with Manufacturers. As a producer, Congoleum is entitled to optimize the sale of its products
by choosing to favor one distributor over another. It is also entit led, however, to c hoose
between distribution a rrangements and companies to carry out those arrangem ents
unrestrai ned by agreements that lack any redeeming virtue. Such agreements inc lude a
conspiracy among distributors or a conspiracy to bribe between a distributor and an employee
of the producer. Here, the conspiracy between Manufacturers a nd Congoleum's sales manager
d estroyed Seaboard's oppo rtunity to compete for Congoleum's business and Congoleum's
ability to reap the advantages of such competition. The court's suggestion that the challenged
conduct did not produce any anticompetitive effect was therefore incorrect. Congoleum ,
incidentally, fired the sales manager upon its discovery of his dealings.
Congoleum possibly may h ave favored Manufacturers even without the bribe. In that
event, Seaboard's claim fa ils for want of causation. The failure of both the court and Seaboard
to focus upon the true conspiracy meant the case never addressed this issue. For a nother
example of this myopic approac h, see G regoris Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. in USA . 630 F.
Supp. 902 (E.D.N .Y. 1986) (auto dealer alleging that competing dea lers br ibed Nissan
employers in order to receive la rger a llotments of a utomobiles fai led to a llege anticompetitive
effect a nd therefore did not state a cla im under sectio n I).
187. In one fairl y commo n situa tion, a firm may resort to bribery despite its original
intention of competing on the basis of price and quality. The situation arises in secret bidding,
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case, classic commercial bribery has the effect of raising prices above
competitive levels. When made by an inefficient firm or an efficient
firm that intends to reap monopoly prices, the bribe's very purpose is
to avoid competition and thereby maintain higher prices (or poorer
quality). 188 Even when used defensively, the bribe's impact is to
increase costs as various bidders curry favor with the dishonest
agent. 189 As the defensive briber's expenses increase and price competition erodes (even though this was not the defensive briber's original
intent), the briber has every incentive to pass the cost of the payoff on
to the buyer. 190
The anticompetitive effect of classic commercial bribery is in fact
remarkably similar to that of price fixing. In price fixing, an agreement between two or more sellers precludes the buyer from obtaining
a competitive market price. 191 In classic commercial bribery, the
where a bidder pays off a contracting agent to disclose to the bidder the contents of other bids
in order to ensure that it is the low bidder. This does not come within the definition of classic
commercial bribery. See supra text accompanying note 35. Moreover, its compet itive effect is
unclear. While this practice may permit the briber to bid higher than it otherwise might secure
with knowledge of the competing bids, the informatio n could cause the briber to bid lower
than it would otherwise have intended had it underestimated its competition.
188. Some writers might argue that situations could arise in which firm s bribe in order to
increase their market share at prices they and others will maintain with or without bribery.
See Note, supra note 134, at 565 n.16. In such an event, the bribe determines who gets the
sales but not the price. This argument assumes a rigidity in pricing that is extremely
improbable in markets in which commercial bribery is most likely to flourish. In highly
competitive markets for fungible goods, firms may sell at prices they do not set. Bribery is
unlikely to occur in such a market, however, because each entrant can sell all its output at the
prevailing price. See id. at 564 n. l3. (Moreover, bribery to obtain sales in such markets above
the known price is easily detected.) At the other extreme, a natural monopolist who sets the
optimum price for its good s need not resort to bribery to gain sales. S ee id. Bribes occur
between these extremes in oligopolistic markets, particularly those involving large negotiated
contracts. S ee id. at 564 & n .l3; supra note 134. A large negotiated contract, by its very
nature, encourages the use of bribery because of the high degree of discretio n conferred upon
the agent and because of the sheer economic importance of closing the deal. In oligopolistic
markets involving such contracts, the briber, by making the payoff, will channel away the
form s of price and nonprice competition that benefits the consumer. Indeed, havmg derailed
price competition. the rational briber should raise prices on the contract procured through a
corrupt agent until he reaches o ne of three limits: (I) A price that a monopolist would charge
to maximize his profits, if the monopolist were able to price discriminate for this particular
customer; (2) a price so striking as to create a risk of detection greater than the added return;
or (J) a price that exceeds whatever sense of loyalty a dishonest agent retains toward his
principal.
189. See Note, supra note 134. at 564-67.
190. The buyer is not completely helpless against commercial bribery. Many, if not m ost,
attempt some monitoring of their agents. This, however, imposes added nonproductive costs
upon the buyer. It also can never be foolproof.
191. See U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., JlO U .S. 150, 222-24 (1940); cf Broadcast Music.
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. I , 8-9 (1979) (price fixin g "is not a question
simply of determining whether two or more potential competitors have literally 'fixed' a
pricl!").
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agreement is between one seller and the agent for the buyer. 192
Because the bribed agent will not consider the bids of other sellers,
this agreement cuts off the buyer's ability to obtain a competitive price
just as much as if the other sellers had agreed not to compete. Indeed,
classic commercial bribery's anticompetitive effect may even be
greater than that of price fixing. In a price fixing conspiracy, there
may be sellers who are not parties to the agreement. Also, parties to
the combination face the ever-present temptation to cheat. 19 3 Thus,
buyers may be able to circumvent the conspiracy. Classic commercial
bribery, in contrast, does not depend upon the agreement and compliance of multiple sellers. Moreover, classic commercial bribery precludes competition on quality as well as price-something few pricefixing conspiracies can do. 194
This analysis suggests that classic commercial bribery creates an
anticompetitive effect that is sufficient, at the very least, to warrant
judicial evaluation under a rule of reason analysis. Furthermore, the
pernicious nature of its anticompetitive effect may provide a basis for
a per se prohibition. Before a court may impose such a prohibition,
however, it must overcome three objections.
First, do courts have sufficient experience with classic commercial bribery to predict confidently its anticompetitive effects? As
noted above, 195 a per se rule is essentially a statement that the judiciary possesses adequate knowledge of the challenged conduct's economic impact to make the production of evidence on that point
(which otherwise would be required under the rule of reason) unnecessary. Courts have had little experience with the competitive impact,
if any, of all the various forms of commercial bribery. 19 6 The same is
not true, however, if the discussion is confined to classic commercial
bribery. As outlined above, the effect of classic commercial bribery is
relatively straightforward and uniformly anticompetitive. 19 7 While
courts have had limited experience with classic commercial bribery
192. See supra text accompanying note 35.
!93. See Posner, Oligopoly and Antitrust L aws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV.
I 562, 1573 ( 1969) ("[F]ew price-fixing conspiracies have come to light in which cheating was
not rife and the benefits to the conspirators enduring.").
194. Cf United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 1982)
(finding that a bid-rigging agreement is " [e]ven more egregiously contrary to vita l compet ition
among businesses" because it "eliminates no t only price competition, but also competition in
service and product quality").
195. See supra text accompanying note 54.
196. In B unker Ramo, for example, the court felt unco mfortable with the extent of judicial
experience in dealing with the economic effect of the type o f briber y scheme that the court
encountered in the case. See Bunker Ramo C orp. v. United Business Forms, I nc., 713 F.2d
1272, 1285 (7th Cir. 1983).
197. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
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cases dealing specifically with section 1 of the Sherman Act (and have
not undertaken any meaningful analysis of its impact in the cases
before them), courts have had much experience with it in other contexts. 198 In none of these contexts have courts found that classic commercial bribery possesses any redeeming procompetitive qualities. 199
Indeed, they occasionally have noted its anticompetitive impact. 200 In
addition, the Federal Trade Commission-an agency with some
expertise on matters of competition-has long condemned commercial bribery. 20 1
The second obstacle to a per se prohibition of classic commercial
bribery would be the existence of any redeeming procompetitive
attributes to the conduct. 202 No such defense has ever been offered to
support classic commercial bribery. Beyond destroying price and
quality competition, about the only impact of such payoffs is the
enrichment of dishonest agents. 203
The final obstacle centers around the question of whether classic
198. See supra note 3.
199. See, e.g., Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 1985)
("Unquestionably, commercial bribery is an indefensible practice ....").
200. For example, one court of appeals noted the anticompetitive effect of a payoff as
follows:
Plainly, the payment of the secret commissions to Fitch ... resulted in lessening
competition in the sale of coal to the Power Company. It would have been
practically impossible for any other company to sell coal to appellee, when the
president of the Power Company had such an understanding with the Coal
Company and such a motive to purchase from it all the coal requirements for his
company.
Fitch v. K entucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12, 16 (6th Cir. 1943).
201. See supra note 3. In its early years, the Federal Trade Commission unde rtook
numerous prosecutions for commercial bribery. See Note, Bribery in Commercial
Relationships, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1251 (1932). At that time, section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act only prohibited unfair methods of competition. See Federal Trade
Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717,719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1982)). Congress added the prohibition upon unfair and deceptive acts in 1938. See Wheeler·
Lea Act of I 938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. Ill, Ill (codified at 15 U.S. C. § 45 ( 1982)). As used in
section 5. "unfair methods of competition" refers primarily to practices that violate the spirit,
if not the letter. of the antitrust laws and not simply to conduct that the Commission might
view in some broad sense to be "unfair." See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,
239 ( 1972).
202. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. I, 7-8 (1979)
(agreements or practices "so often" lacking any redeeming value are per se invalid):
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S . 36, 50 (1977) (pernicious effect on
competition and "lack of any redeeming virtue" lead to a per se prohibition); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958) (same).
203. Commercial bribery might allow less efficient competitors to obtain contracts and
remain in a market. This impact is likely to be short lived, however, once more efficient
competitors retaliate with their own bribes. More fundamentally, the maintenance of
inefficient companies through anticompetitive agreements is antithetical to the goals of the
Sherman Act.
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commercial bribery, which may only involve one contract, has a sufficient market impact to merit per se treatment. Before courts will consider conduct to be in restraint of trade, the conduct must be shown to
have created a substantial effect in a defined market. 2 04 Furthermore,
courts will not impose per se treatment on tying arrangements or
coercive reciprocal dealing unless the conduct affects a substantial
quantity of trade.205 While commercial bribery often creates such an
impact, 206 this should not be a prerequisite to its per se illegality.
First, classic commercial bribery has no offsetting economic or other
social utility to balance its anticompetitive effect. 207 On the contrary,
it is universally prohibited and often criminal under state and federal
law. With absolutely nothing to offset its adverse impact on competition, there seems no reason to require that bribery create a quantitatively significant effect. 208
Courts, moreover, have applied a per se analysis to practices that
are analogous to classic commercial bribery even though those practices did not have a substantial market effect. Price fixing, for example, is illegal without regard to the quantity of trade restrained. 209
Given the close parallel in impact between classic commercial bribery
and price fixing, courts should treat both practices the same way.
One form of price fixing, bid rigging, is an even more compelling
example. Firms commonly use two primary met hods to circumvent
the competitive bidding process for government or private contracts.
One is bid rigging-an agreement by other bidders not to go below
one contractor's proposal. The other is classic commercial bribery.
204. See. e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F .2d 547,
562 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 1004 (1975); Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495
F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 ( 1974); El Cid, Ltd . v. New Jersey
Zinc C o., 551 F. Supp. 626, 632 (S.D.N. Y. 1982), a.Jf'd, 770 F .2d 157 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 573 (1985). But cf NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110
n.42 (1984) ("Where the anticompetitive effects of cond uct can be ascertained through means
short of extensive market analysis, and where no countervailing competitive virtues are
evident, a lengthy analysis of market power is not necessary.").
205. S ee supra notes 156 & 165 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
207. This is in contrast to most other restraints on trade, including tie-ins, that on occasion
could serve some legitimate purpose. S ee supra note 166 and accompanying text.
208 . As the Supreme Court has no ted: "Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad
generalizations about the social utility of particular commercial practices. The probability that
anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences
must be balanced against its procompetitive consequences." Continental T.V .. Im:. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc ., 43 3 U.S. 36, 50 n.l6 (1977) (emphasis added); see also Ka ne v. Martin Paint
St ores, Inc .. 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 65,176 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (" Anticompctitive co nduct
which lacks economic justification is not saved from the ban of the [Sherman} Act because it
affects only a small amount of commerce.").
209. S ee, e.g.• United States v. So cony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U .S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
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Bid rigging is a violation of section 1, even if it affects only one contract and regardless of the small size of that contract. 210 Because
commercial bribery accomplishes the same result as bid rigging, it
seems only reasonable that courts should subject commercial bribery
to the same prohibition. 211
Ill.

ISSUES COLLATERAL TO THE SHERMAN ACT
CAUSE OF ACTION

Commercial bribery claims brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act raise two additional questions that are potentially troublesome. First, who has standing to assert such a claim? Second, does
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine bar section 1 claims predicated on the
payoff of a government official? The answers to these questions will
bear heavily upon the scope of a cause of action for classic commercial bribery under section 1.
A.

Standing to Assert Commercial Bribery Claims
Under the Sherman Act

Though few would dispute that a competitor who loses business
due to a payoff would have standing to sue the parties to the bribe for
violating the Sherman Act/ 12 less certainty exists when the plaintiff is
210. See, e.g., United States v. Bensinger Co. , 430 F .2d 584, 588 (8th Cir. 1970). If,
however, the bid rigging involves only intrastate activities, then it must substantially affect
interstate commerce in order to meet the Act's jurisdiction prerequisites. See id.
211. One difference between commercial bribery and bid rigging involves the nature of the
quid pro quo. In bid rigging, one bidder often defers to ano ther in exchange for the other's
agreement to do the same for it on a future contract. Thus, the impact of the conspiracy
normally extends beyond one contract. Nevertheless, such impact is not a necessary element
to the per se illegality of bid rigging. In any event, although commercial bribery may involve
one payoff to an agent in exchange for a single contract. the practice is more likely to breed
future payoffs. For example, the briber and the corrupt agent commonly agree to a continuing
arrangement covering all contracts under the agent's control that invo lve the briber's product
or service. See. e.g. , Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 688 (9th Cir.)
(per curiam) (illegal commission agreement involving sales for an entire year), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 940 (1970); W.T. Grant & Co. v. Christensen, 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) f. 60,324
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (bribery used in scheme to commit store to a number of unfavorable lease
arrangements); Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 395 (D. Idaho
1964) (bribes made to defendant for over six years), aff'd, 35 1 F .2d 85 1 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 936 ( 1966). Also, a company successfully bribing one agent often follows the
practice by bribing ot hers. See, e.g., Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624
F.2d 1342, 1347 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendant obtained a number of contracts through bribery),
cerr. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981). Further, other companies may be led to engage in the
practice in order to compete. See Note, supra note 134, at 564-67.
212. See, e.g.. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F .2d 1342, 1362-63
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); W.T. Grant Co. v. Christensen, 1975 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ~ 60,324 (S.D. N.Y. 1975). Of course, competitors have the difficult burden of
proving that they would have received the contract had there been no bribe.
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the principal of the agent who received a bribe. In W. T. Grant Co. v.
Christensen, 2 13 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that a bribed agent's principal had no standing. Grant alleged that the defendants bribed several of its officers. 21 4
In exchange for the bribes, the officers agreed to place a number of
Grant's stores in the defendants' shopping centers under leases with
unreasonably high rents, unfavorable terms, and at poor locations. 21 5
Grant sued alleging violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and
various state laws. 216 The district court dismissed the complaint,
holding that Grant was outside the "target area" of the alleged antitrust conspiracy and thus lacked standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 217 In contrast, the court noted that other lessors, as direct
competitors of the defendant, might have had standing to sue. 218
The broad language of section 4 of the Clayton Act would seem
to provide a cause of action for anyone injured in his business or property as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws. Courts, however,
have developed limitations that reduce the impact of this broad provision. One test, which the court in W T. Grant attempted to apply, is
the requirement that the plaintiff be in the "target area" of the alleged
antitrust violation. 219 This means that the plaintiff must be an
intended or foreseeable victim of the defendant's activities. 220 On its
face it is difficult to understand the court's conclusion that a principal
such as Grant is not within the target area of the alleged classic commercial bribery. By engaging in bribery, the briber intended to
deprive the principal of the lowest price or best quality.
In any event, the target area approach to standing appears obsolete in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Associated General
Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters. 221 The Court in
213. 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 60,324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
214. ld.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. ! d. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in part as follows: " [A)ny person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor . .. and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
incl uding a reasonable atto rney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
218. W.T . Grant & Co. v. Christensen, 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 60,324 (S.D .N .Y. 1975).
219. See. e.g., Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292,
1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431
F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 40 1 U.S. 923 (1971); SCM Corp. v. RCA, 407 F.2d
!66, 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U .S. 943 (1 969).
220. See, e.g., Calderone Enters. Corp., 454 F .2d at 1295 ("person against whom the
conspiracy was aimed" has standing); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir.
1967) (the target area is "the area which it could reasonably be foreseen would be affected").
221. 459 U.S. 519 ( 1983). For a general discussion of antitrust standing, see Comment, A
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that case adopted a multifactor test to determine whether a Clayton
Act plaintiff has standing. The factors the Court examined include:
(1) The existence of a causal connection between the violation and the
plaintiff's harm; (2) whether the defendant intended to cause this
harm; (3) whether the plaintiff's injury was of a type Congress sought
to address in providing a private remedy for violation of the antitrust
laws; (4) whether the defendant's conduct directly or indirectly
caused the injury; (5) the existence of another class of potential plain·
tiffs more directly injured who can sue to vindicate the public interest;
(6) the speculative nature of the damages; and (7) the possibility of
duplicative recovery. 222 Under these factors, it is clear that the princi·
pal of the bribed agent would have standing. The existence of harm to
the principal in the form of higher prices, poorer quality, or both, and
the briber's intent to cause this harm have already been noted. That
this is the type of harm Congress was concerned with in providing a
private remedy follows directly from the previous discussion of why
classic commercial bribery should be considered a per se violation of
the Sherman Act. 223 A comparison with price fixing is again instructive. The principal of a bribed agent is in a very similar position as the
consumer whose suppliers engage in price fixing. Such consumers
have standing to sue the price fixers. 224 Further, the injury to the
bribed agent's principal is caused directly by the bribe rather than
being derivative of an injury inflicted on another. 225 While the
briber's competitors constitute another class of prospective plaintiffs,
their injury is no more direct than that of the principal. Indeed,
because the competitors' damages are more speculative, 226 they are
less likely to sue. Finally, even if competitors sue, their recovery of
lost profits would not duplicate the principal's recovery for higher
prices paid or lower quality received.
B.

The Impact of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

Discussion of payoffs to government officials often brings to mind
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Under this doctrine, which flows
Farewell to Arms: The Implementation of a Policy-Based Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble
Damages Actions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 437 (1984).
222. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537-46.
223. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
224. E.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979); see also Associated Gen.
Contractors, 459 U.S. at 529-30 n.l9 (actions may be maintained by consumers).
225. Cf Kreager v. General Elec. Co., 497 F .2d 468 (2d Cir.) (shareholder suing for harm
to their corporation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 861 ( 1974); Billy Baxter. Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
431 F .2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970) (franchisor suing for harm to its franchisee), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
923 (1971).
226. See supra note 212.
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from two Supreme Court decisions, 2 2 7 solicitation of government
action, even if intended to restrain or eliminate competition, is normally not a violation of the Sherman Act. 228 The following brief analysis demonstrates that the rule is inapposite to classic commercial
bribery involving government officials.
The dual bases for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine are to preserve
a free flow of information to representatives in a democracy and to
avoid chilling first amendment rights. 229 Neither of these goals is in
any way advanced by allowing persons to bribe public officials to
obtain government contracts. First, the doctrine has little, if any,
application to solicitation of commercial action by government. For
example, in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 2 30
the Supreme Court found Noerr to be inapplicable because the defendants in that case "were engaged in private commercial activity, no
element of which involved seeking to procure the passage or enforcement of laws." 231 Since Continental Ore, lower courts have been
divided over whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has an exception
for commercial activities. 232 Even those courts refusing to recognize a
227. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 38 1 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 ( 1961).
228. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
229. E.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972);
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
230. 370 u.s. 690 (1962).
23 1. !d. at 707. In Continental Oil, the Canadian government appointed one of the
defendant companies to purchase and allocate all vanadium needed by the country's industries
during Wo rld War II. !d. at 695. The plaintiff charged that this company refused to purchase
vanadium from it as part of a conspiracy to eliminate the plaintiff from the market. ld.
Some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Pennington refutes
t he recognition of any commercial exception. See Rill & Frank, supra note 8, at 152. In
Pennington, the defendants solicited the Secretary of Labor to establish a minimum wage for
companies selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). 381 U.S. at 660. They also
lobbied the TVA to curtail spot market purc hases, which were exempt from the minimum
wage requirement. Jd. at 660-61. Hence, Pennington in volved government procurement. It
oversimplifies the case, however, to suggest that the Court was simply looking at a government
decision to choose one supplier over another. Rather, the Court recognized that the
defendants had lobbied for a policy decision that would promote certain labor practices. See
George R. Whitten , Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 32 ( 1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 ( 1970).
232. D ecisions holding or suggesting that the doctrine is inapplicable to commercial acts
include: Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt , 694 F.2d 1358, 1365 (5th Cir. 1983); Federal
Prescription Serv. v. American Pharmaceutical .Ass'n, 663 F. 2d 253, 263 & n.IO (D .C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied , 455 U.S. 928 ( 1982); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 36 & n.6 ( 1st Cir. 198 1);
Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F .2d 580, 592 n.IO (7th Cir. 1977), vacated
mem .. 435 U.S. 992, reinstated per curiam, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied , 439 U.S.
1090 ( 1979); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F .2d 931, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972); Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v . Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers
Local No. 150, 440 F .2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 ( 197 1); Woods
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am. , 438 F.2d 1286, 1296-97 (5th Cir.
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categorical exception, however, have considered the government's
role as a factor in determining whether the defendant's conduct
should be considered lobbying and thus permissible. 233 The courts
thus generally agree that when the government engages in an activity
that allows it to be the victim of anticompetitive conduct (such as bid
rigging or commercial bribery) that is no different in its effects than if
the government were a private consumer, there is no reason to afford
the government less protection under the antitrust laws than that
afforded private consumers. The defendant's anticompetitive activity-classic commercial bribery-therefore falls outside the scope of
the rule's protection. Second, it would be anomalous to suggest that
courts must permit persons to bribe government officials on the
grounds that such activity is necessary to promote informed governmental decisions and to protect first amendment rights, when the
bribery of government officials is already prohibited by state and federal law. 234 In the language of the cases, bribery fans within the sham
exception to the doctrine. 235
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); City of Atlanta v.
Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,527 (N.D. Ga. 1981); General Aircraft
Corp. v. Air Am., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 1979); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific
Resources, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1359, 1384-85 (D. Hawaii 1978).
Contrary decisions include: Greenwood Utils. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751
F.2d 1484, 1505 & n. l4 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84,
88 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983); Household Goods Carriers' Bureau v.
Terrell, 452 F.2d 152, 158 & n. l8 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987 (1974); Bustop
Shelters, Inc. v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 996 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F . Supp. 546, 556 n.6 (S.D.N .Y. 1980); United States
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 245 F. Supp. 74, 82 (E.D . Pa. 1965).
233. See Greenwood Utils. Comm 'n, 751 F .2d at 1505 n.l4 ("All would agree that ... if as
the result of a price fixing agreement by private parties the government pays more for products
it purchases in the marketplace, the participants in the marketplace should not escape liability
because of the identity of the victim."); In re Airport Car R ental Antitrust Litl'g., 693 F.2d at 88
("[T]he nature of the governmental activity is one factor in determining the type of public
input acceptable to the particular decision-making process.").
234. See supra note 3.
235. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513
(1972); In re Airport Cor Rental Antitrust Litig. , 693 F.2d at 86-87; Federal Prescriprion Serv.,
663 F.2d at 263: Dominicus Americano Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 684,
690 n.3 (S.D .N.Y. 1979); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301,
1313-14 (E.D . Mich. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 666 F .2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981); see also
Sacramento Coco-Colo Bou/ing Co., 440 F.2d at 1099 (Noerr-Pennington does not protect
efforts to influence government through illegal means including threats and other coercive
measures); cf United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,671 (1965) (suggesting Noerr
does not apply if government official is a co-conspirator). But see Busrop Shelters, 521 F . Supp.
at 996 (approving view that campaign contributions do not bring case within sham eltception);
Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F . Supp. 696, 704 (D. Colo. 1975)
(bribes without anticompetitive impact did not bring case within sham eltception); cf Metro
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CoNCLUSION

It is not difficult to understand the courts' failure to reach a
coherent approach regarding commercial bribery claims under the
Sherman Act. At first glance, the practice of commercial bribery does
not appear to be the stuff of traditional antitrust violations. This leads
to the inevitable suspicion that the plaintiff is dressing up what is
properly a state law claim in antitrust clothing simply to obtain access
to the federal courts and treble damages. 236 Careful analysis reveals,
however, that classic commercial bribery is an agreement that has the
effect of eroding price and quality competition. Indeed, it is a most
pernicious anticompetitive practice because it can deprive government
and corporate entities-which only transact business through their
agents-of the advantages of free competition. This, in turn, raises
costs throughout society. As a result, rather than being foreign to the
purposes of the Sherman Act, a per se prohibition on classic commercial bribery is long overdue.

Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc .. 516 F.2d 220, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1975) ("substantial"
campaign contributions come within Noerr-PenninglOn).
236. The fact that state Jaws al so penalize an activity does not preclude Sherman Act
coverage. E.g.. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am .. 438 F.2d 1286,
1302-03 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S . 1047 (1972). Indeed, given the numerous
federal laws attacking commercial bribery, one cannot say it would offend notions of
federalism or burden United States court~ with matters beneath them to allow the Sherman
A ct to also reach this co nduct. On the other hand. the presence of these other federal and state
laws doe~ not render application of the Sherman Act against commercial bribery pointless.
The treble damage private action rs a useful supplement to criminal prosecution because it
brings to bear the resources of parties with the most immediate stake in (and the most
likelihood to become aware of) commercial bribery: the corrupt agent's principal and the
briber's competitors.

